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INTRODUCTION

In his characteristically challenging manner, Professor Raj Bhala confronts us with a strong thesis: that the Doha Development Round (“DDR”)
is a failed counterinsurgency operation.1 Bhala argues that the DDR was
launched to spur development and reduce poverty—particularly among
Muslims—and thereby increase security in a post-9/11 world, only to fall
back into the all too predictable pattern of powerful states pursuing their
national interest (narrowly conceived).2
Bhala situates this thesis in a broader context, namely that trade has
always been about development and national security, and Muslims have
always been fundamentally engaged in trade.3 In this sense, the connection
between trade, development, and security is not new, nor is Muslim participation. What has changed is the scope of this phenomenon and the current
1. Raj Bhala, Poverty, Islamist Extremism, and the Debacle of Doha Round Counter-Terrorism: Part One of a Trilogy—Agricultural Tariffs and Subsidies, 9 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 5, 9
(2012).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 11; see also Asif H. Qureshi, International Trade for Development: The WTO as a
Development Institution?, 43 J. WORLD TRADE 173, 173 (2009) (reviewing and debunking the
argument that the WTO is not a development institution).
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level of global concern about it.4 We are no longer talking simply of local
or regional trade patterns, but global trade, and in a similar sense we are
concerned with global security, not merely national security. That is the
chief blessing (and burden) of globalization: We now sink or swim, develop
or fail to develop, grow more or less secure, together, and we understand
this as never before.5
If Bhala is correct, then the failure of the DDR is more than just the
failure of any ordinary trade round. It represents a historic failure to decisively shift global trade in the direction of increased support for development—a paradigm shift, if you will6—and a lost opportunity to increase
global security and cross-cultural understanding at a time when we can ill
afford to waste any such opportunity.7
My role in this conversation is to help ensure that we consider his
arguments in the largest possible context. We do not want to lose sight of
the fundamental importance of the issues Bhala is raising about the nature
and long-term impact of the contemporary trading system, even as we debate whether the DDR is in the end entirely, or even partly, about combating Islamicist extremism.8 In the end, I think Bhala is right about the larger
stakes of the game, and the ongoing threat to security, let alone prosperity,
posed by the persistence of narrow mercantilist strategies among the
world’s wealthiest nations.
To begin with, I applaud Bhala’s efforts to situate trade in the larger
context of fundamental human needs and endeavors. In my view, trade is a
fundamental part of human experience. It encapsulates our relation to the
world, our encounter with the world, and our domination of the world.
Trade is fundamentally an exchange of goods and services, an exchange of
economic value. Through this exchange we come into contact with different
people, lands, cultures, and ideas. We discover and create our own identity
4. Rokiah Alavi, Trade Protectionism Under the WTO: The Impact on Muslim Countries,
23 J. ECON. COOPERATION 1, 1 (2002); Raj Bhala, Poverty, Islam, and Doha: Unmet Challenges
Facing American Trade Law, 36 INT’L L. 159, 159 (2002).
5. The current crisis with Greece of course illustrates this phenomenon, as does financial
globalization in general: The fiscal policies of a country of roughly 10 million people can threaten
the stability of world financial markets. Kemal Derviş, Small Economies, Big Problems, and
Global Interdependence, BROOKINGS (July 19, 2011), http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/
2011/0719_greece_economy_dervis.aspx.
6. See Frank J. Garcia, Beyond Special and Differential Treatment, 27 B.C. INT’L & COMP.
L. REV. 291, 299–301 (2004).
7. The High Level Trade Experts Group Interim Report notes that the role of development
in the WTO has changed as developing countries such as China and Brazil have been rapidly
growing; nevertheless, a development-friendly deal must necessarily be proportionate to a country’s development. HIGH LEVEL TRADE EXPERTS GRP., THE DOHA ROUND: SETTING A DEADLINE,
DEFINING A FINAL DEAL 6 (Jan. 2011, Interim Report), available at http://www.acp-eu-trade.org/
library/files/High%20level%20trade%20experts%20group_EN_010111_The%20doha%20round
%20setting%20a%20deadline.pdf.
8. See Robert J. Delahunty, Trade, War, and Terror: A Reply to Bhala, 9 U. ST. THOMAS
L.J. 161, 162 (2012).

\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\9-1\UST104.txt

196

unknown

Seq: 3

UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL

3-OCT-12

8:47

[Vol. 9:1

as we come into contact with others through trade. In this way, trade is a
primal form of communication, expressing who we are, what we make,
what we want, and how we exchange.9
In an equally fundamental sense, trade has also always been about justice, both at the transactional level (fair bargains, which presuppose consent) and at the structural level (just economic arrangements within and
between states through fair and freely bargained treaties).10 Here I believe
we find the core of Bhala’s argument, with which I entirely agree: the current pattern of trade and trade regulation is skewed against development, it
is particularly skewed against the possibility of benefits flowing to Muslim
participants, and this bears a clear, if complex, relationship to security. In
other words, his argument is that the contemporary trading system is unjust
and that this injustice matters on normative grounds and on security
grounds.
The normative reasons we should care about injustice are well documented, and I will say more about them in a moment—they range from
secular cosmopolitan arguments about global justice to pathbreaking work
such as Bhala’s book on trade and Catholic social thought.11 On the security
side, the social science literature on justice supports Bhala’s argument as
well. Psychologists have established an important empirical relationship between trade, justice, and security, involving the social consequences of perceptions of injustice.12 Their research suggests that the human perception of
injustice is one of the most powerful motivators in the human psyche.13 For
this reason, our perceptions of the relative justice or injustice of the trading
system, and our emotive response to these perceptions, add an important
dimension to trade’s capacity to increase or decrease peace and security.14
This is the context within which I believe we should evaluate Bhala’s
argument and the parallel thesis I would offer in tandem with Bhala’s own:
that Doha is about—or should have been about—remedying unjust trade
9. See Frank J. Garcia, Is Free Trade “Free?” Is it Even “Trade?” Oppression and Consent
in Hemispheric Trade Agreements, 5 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 505, 507 (2007) [hereinafter
Garcia, Is Free Trade “Free?”].
10. On the relationship between trade and justice, see Frank J. Garcia & Lindita Ciko, Theories of Justice and International Economic Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON GLOBAL JUSTICE
AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW (John Linarelli ed., 2012) (forthcoming).
11. RAJ BHALA, TRADE, DEVELOPMENT, AND SOCIAL JUSTICE (2003); see also Raj Bhala,
Philosophical, Religious, and Legalistic Perspectives on Equal Human Dignity and U.S. Free
Trade Agreements, 28 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 9 (2008).
12. See generally Kjell Tornblöom, The Social Psychology of Distributive Justice, in JUSTICE: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 177 (Klaus R. Scherer ed., 1992).
13. Klaus R. Scherer, Issues in the Study of Justice, in JUSTICE: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 1, 7 (Klaus R. Scherer ed. 1992) (“Strong expectations coupled with the feeling of having
invested in making the expectations come true obviously produce feelings of entitlement. Violations of such entitlements can then be defined as perceived injustice and will reliably provoke
strong negative emotional reactions.”).
14. See Frank J. Garcia, Trade, Justice and Security, in TRADE AS GUARANTOR OF PEACE
LIBERTY & SECURITY? (Padideh Ala’i et al. eds., 2006).
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patterns, which, in addition to violating our core values about fairness, also
breed resentment and anger and thereby increase the potential for violence.
In order to develop this argument, I will introduce the global justice debate
about economic fairness, and the social psychology literature about the effects of injustice.
II. TRADE, JUSTICE,

AND

SECURITY

The question of justice and international trade is at heart a question of
fairness: Are the rules, institutions, and outcomes in transnational economic
relations “fair” or “unfair?” Addressing this question involves us in some of
the most complicated and contentious issues of economic and political theory today. Here I will approach this question from two directions: first,
within the global justice debate about the overall fairness of the global economic system; and second, within the social psychology literature about
injustice and its effects on people and society.
A. Why Justice Matters to Trade and Trade Law
I will address the question of trade and justice in three ways: first, by
offering a general overview of the relationship between trade and justice;
second, by looking at trade and justice from an external perspective involving normative political theory; and finally, taking a different, internal approach to the question of fairness in trade and trade law.
1. The Fundamental Relationship Between Trade and Justice
I want to begin by making three interrelated points about the relationship between theories of justice and international trade law today.15 First,
international trade is part of a larger field we have come to call international
economic law.16 By this I mean the public international law of economic
relations between states and, to an extent, between states, individuals, and
firms, together with the treaty-based institutions (such as the WTO, the
IMF, and the World Bank) created to implement, monitor, and adjudicate
this body of law. This field is dominated by legal regimes whose aim is
trade liberalization but also includes international financial law, international investment law, and the international law of economic development.
This is significant, because we are no longer just talking about the terms of
trade involving goods and services: We are talking about the comprehensive regulation of a global economy.
15. In the discussion that follows, I am drawing on a more extensive treatment of these issues
in Garcia & Ciko, supra note 10.
16. See John Linarelli, Introduction to RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON GLOBAL JUSTICE AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW, supra note 10; Steve Charnovitz, What is International Economic
Law?, 14 J. INT’L ECON. L. 3, 3–22 (2011); Joel P. Trachtman, The International Economic Law
Revolution, 17 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 33, 36–37 (1996). See generally IGNAZ SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW (1999).

\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\9-1\UST104.txt

198

unknown

Seq: 5

UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL

3-OCT-12

8:47

[Vol. 9:1

Second, by theories of justice I mean that branch of political theory
(going back to Aristotle) that concerns itself with the allocative fairness of
social institutions.17 In other words, justice concerns itself with how rights,
resources, privileges, and opportunities are divided among those with a
share in the relevant community, system or enterprise, and whether that
allocation is “fair” according to the relevant standards of those affected by
it.18 In the trade and justice debate, we are not just talking about procedural
or “legal” justice; we are talking about the basic socioeconomic organization of an emerging global society.
And, finally, there is an essential and increasingly recognized relationship between these two fields, and we call it global justice or the global
justice debate. International economic law and its institutions are powerful
engines of resource allocation, between states and within states among various groups, entities, firms, and individuals.19 This is particularly well understood with respect to trade20 and is also increasingly studied with respect
to international investment and financial law as well.21
This relationship is of more than academic interest—as Bhala’s work
makes clear. There is a lot at stake in the fairness or unfairness of the trading system. This is so for three reasons: poverty, globalization, and governance. The stark figures on global poverty, with an undeniable (but
contentious) connection to economic relations between and within countries, highlight the human costs associated with this relationship.22 Second,
globalization and the debate on global justice have foregrounded the key
role that international economic law and its institutions play in shaping the
17. For an overview, see Gillian Brock, Theories of Global Justice, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK
GLOBAL JUSTICE AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW, supra note 10; see also SIMON CANEY,
JUSTICE BEYOND BORDERS: A GLOBAL POLITICAL THEORY (2006).
18. See generally FRANK J. GARCIA, TRADE, INEQUALITY AND JUSTICE: TOWARD A LIBERAL
THEORY OF JUST TRADE (2003) [hereinafter GARCIA, TRADE, INEQUALITY AND JUSTICE] .
19. See Aaron James, Distributive Justice Without Sovereign Rule: The Case of Trade, 31
SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 533, 533 (2005); Joost Pauwelyn, Christian Barry, Susan Esserman &
Frank J. Garcia, Just Trade Under Law: Do We Need a Theory of Justice for International Trade
Relations? 100 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 375, 376–77 (2006); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, DeFragmentation of International Economic Law Through Constitutional Interpretation and Adjudication with Due Respect for Reasonable Disagreement, 6 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 209, 247
(2008).
20. See generally GLOBAL JUSTICE AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: OPPORTUNITIES
AND PROSPECTS (Chios Carmody, Frank J. Garcia & John Linarelli eds., 2012).
21. See generally Linarelli, supra note 16.
22. See Thomas Pogge, Severe Poverty as a Human Rights Violation, in FREEDOM FROM
POVERTY AS A HUMAN RIGHT 11, 11–53 (Thomas Pogge ed., 2008); see also Chantal Thomas,
Poverty Reduction, Trade, and Rights, 18 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1399, 1401–04 (2003); Joel
Trachtman, Legal Aspects of a Poverty Agenda at the WTO: Trade Law and ‘Global Apartheid’, 6
J. INT’L ECON. L. 3, 3 (2003). The nature of the connection between poverty and transnational
economic relations is a highly contentious question, but scholars from all points on the spectrum
agree that there is one. See, e.g., Thomas Pogge, Moral Universalism and Global Economic Justice, 1 POL. PHIL. & ECON. 29, 29–58 (2002); Fernando R. Tesón & Jonathan Klick, Global
Justice and Trade, in GLOBAL JUSTICE AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW (Chios Carmody,
Frank J. Garcia & John Linarelli eds., 2012) [hereinafter Tesón and Klick, Global Justice].
ON
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contours of the global economy and its opportunities, burdens, and resources.23 And, third, the increasing scope and power of such institutions as
a form of transnational governance has brought them into greater and muchneeded scrutiny with respect to their normative underpinnings, legitimacy,
and allocative effects.24
In view of these developments, theories of justice play a critical role in
helping us evaluate whether or not the trading system as a whole, and specific treaties, rules, and institutions, are “fair” or “unfair” according to our
various competing understandings of such principles. Amartya Sen has recently written persuasively about the two major differing approaches to
such an inquiry: the “transcendental institutionalism” approach in which we
seek a single comprehensive view of fairness; and the “realization-focused
comparison” approach in which multiple competing views of fairness (and
unfairness) help us reach a decision to act against grave injustice according
to a variety of reasons.25 He favors the latter approach, and his essential
point is that we need a rich multitude of critical views on fairness and unfairness in global economic relations if we are to persuasively and effectively address social injustice.26 My discussion here will proceed in that
spirit.
There are several ways through which the fairness of international institutions such as trade law can be assessed. The most common approach is
to look at trade law through the lens of normative political theory and assess
institutional consistency with broad political values such as cosmopolitanism, egalitarian fairness, or democratic participation.27 Another approach is
to use what Aaron James has called “internal” approaches to justice, in
which one looks either at the mandate and formal structure of an organization as well as its members’ expectations (what James calls “structural eq23. See, e.g., GLOBAL JUSTICE AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: OPPORTUNITIES AND
PROSPECTS, supra note 20, at 1–13; DAVID KINLEY, CIVILISING GLOBALISATION: HUMAN RIGHTS
AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 1–3 (2009); RICHARD W. MILLER, GLOBALIZING JUSTICE: THE ETHICS
OF POVERTY AND POWER 3–5 (2010); Antony Anghie, Time Present and Time Past: Globalization, International Financial Institutions, and the Third World, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 243,
244 (2000); Frank J. Garcia, Globalization and the Theory of International Law, 11 INT’L LEGAL
THEORY 9, 9–10 (2005); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Human Rights, International Economic Law
and ‘Constitutional Justice’, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 769, 770–71 (2008); Mathias Risse, How Does
the Global Order Harm the Poor?, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 349, 350 (2005).
24. Allen Buchanan & Robert O. Keohane, The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions, 20 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 405, 405–07 (2006); Robert Howse & Kalypso Nicolaidis, Enhancing WTO Legitimacy: Constitutionalization or Global Subsidiarity?, 16 GOVERNANCE 73, 73
(2003); Patricia Nanz, Democratic Legitimacy of Transnational Trade Governance: A View from
Political Theory, in CONSTITUTIONALISM, MULTILATERAL TRADE GOVERNANCE AND SOCIAL REGULATION 59, 59–82 (Christian Joerges & E-U Petersmann eds., 2006).
25. AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 24–27 (2009).
26. Frank J. Garcia, Three Takes on Global Justice, 31 U. LA VERNE L. REV. 323, 347–48
(2010).
27. An excellent recent example is GILLIAN BROCK, GLOBAL JUSTICE: A COSMOPOLITAN ACCOUNT (2009).
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uity”)28 or at core constitutive elements of the underlying social interaction
(here, the role of consent in trade as a human experience)29 and then evaluates the performance of the organization against those “internal”
elements.30
2. The External Approach to Trade and Justice
The essential characteristic of all external approaches (and most current approaches are external) is that they take a particular normative theory
and apply it to a body of law.31 They are “external” because the theory
underlying the analysis is not “legal” in a positive sense but comes from
moral theory, political theory, or some other branch of social theory that
concerns itself with fairness.32 On this view, even an economic analysis of
trade law is really just another external analysis of trade and justice, though
one that has (perhaps unfairly and certainly uncritically) held a privileged
place in the analysis of international trade law.33
One way to ground an external critique of the fairness of trade law is
to base the relationship between political theory and trade law on the functional characteristics of trade law as a social institution. The primary impetus towards justice, according to Rawls, is the fact that social cooperation
gives rise to certain benefits and burdens, which need to be allocated. For
that cooperative social scheme to be just, those benefits and burdens should
be allocated according to some relevant idea of what is “right.”34 In Beitz’s
words, “the requirements of justice apply to institutions and practices
(whether or not they are genuinely cooperative) in which social activity
produces relative or absolute benefits or burdens that would not exist if the
social activity did not take place.”35
International economic relations satisfy this condition because they
create rights, privileges, and obligations through trade agreements and can
28. Aaron James, Global Economic Fairness: Internal Principles, in DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW (Frank Garcia, Chios Carmody & John Linarelli, eds.)
(forthcoming) [hereinafter James, Internal Principles].
29. See Garcia, Is Free Trade “Free?”, supra note 9, at 507.
30. See Garcia & Ciko, supra note 10.
31. See, e.g., BROCK, supra note 27, at 48–58.
32. A wide range of social theory concerns itself with justice and is therefore relevant to the
inquiry. See KARL R. SCHERER, JUSTICE: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ix–xi (1992).
33. GARCIA, TRADE, INEQUALITY AND JUSTICE, supra note 18, at 14–19. But see Tesón &
Klick, Global Justice, supra note 22, at 217–60.
34. JOHN RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE 4–5 (Oxford Univ. Press 1999) (1971).
35. CHARLES R. BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 131 (1979).
Barry objects to the extension of justice as fairness obligations to international society on the basis
of such economic relations, questioning whether such relations are in fact sufficiently reciprocal
and dependent. See Brian Barry, Humanity and Justice in Global Perspective, in NOMOS XXIV
219, 232–34 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1982). As Beitz has since clarified,
however, he is not arguing for the necessity of such obligations on the grounds of such relations
but merely for their relevance. See Charles R. Beitz, Cosmopolitan Ideals and National Sentiment,
80 J. PHIL. 591, 595 (1983).
AND
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lead to increases in individual and national wealth through the operation of
comparative advantage and principles of efficiency in general. Justice is
therefore relevant to the operation of the social institutions that effectuate
the international allocation of the benefits and burdens of international economic cooperation, principally international trade law.
This “institutionalist” approach is only one way to justify the normative study of trade law. Alternative approaches to this analysis include a
cosmopolitan approach emphasizing trade law’s impact on individuals’ life
prospects36 or a human rights approach emphasizing trade law’s impact on
fundamental rights.37 Naturally, different theories will articulate this relationship in the distinct terms relevant to that theory.38 Together, these accounts perform the same conceptual function, namely to justify the
relationship between trade law and an extrinsic normative theory as a general matter, before proceeding to apply a particular theory to trade law.
Coming back to the present inquiry, let us then look at just a few of the
arguments about the justice or injustice of the trading system. For example,
cosmopolitans would argue that the contemporary trading system is unjust
according to cosmopolitan principals of justice. There are almost as many
different accounts of what cosmopolitan justice would look like as there are
cosmopolitans, and they can be deontological, consequentialist, or rights
based, but they share certain features in common.39 Principally, cosmopolitanism in its purest form maintains that all persons must be included within
the scope of distributive justice regardless of territory or nationality and that
their moral equality must be reflected in their distributive treatment.
What exactly that treatment must consist of will differ according to the
theorist, but cosmopolitan accounts all share the view that the current trading system fails to meet this obligation. The precise nature of the failure
will again differ by theorist but can include the trading system’s not supporting the capacities of vulnerable human actors, thus failing a core Kantian requirement;40 not minimizing or preventing avoidable harmful
36. See, e.g., CANEY, supra note 17, at 3–7 (setting out cosmopolitan criteria for just social
arrangements); see also Priscilla Schwartz, Development in World Trade Law, 4 J. INT’L COM. L.
& TECH. 50, 50 (2009). The most prominent theory on the relation of international economics and
human development is the capabilities approach developed by Amartya Sen with Martha Nussbaum and others. For an overview of the capabilities approach, see generally Ingrid Robeyns, The
Capability Approach: A Theoretical Survey, 6 J. HUM. DEV. 93 (2005).
37. See, e.g., Carol C. Gould, Approaching Global Justice Through Human Rights: Elements
of Theory and Practice, in GLOBAL JUSTICE AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: OPPORTUNITIES
AND PROSPECTS, supra note 20, at 27, 33–39; Gillian Moon, The WTO-Minus Strategy: Development and Human Rights Under WTO Law, 2 HUM. RTS. & INT’L LEGAL DISCOURSE 37, 38 (2008).
38. Utilitarian or libertarian approaches would, for example, focus on the utility effects of
trade rules or their impact on individual liberty and property rights. See GARCIA, TRADE, INEQUALITY AND JUSTICE, supra note 18, at 53–64.
39. CANEY, supra note 17, at 70, 105–07, 116–19.
40. See, e.g., ONORA O’NEILL, BOUND OF JUSTICE 136–42 (2000). A principle of justice must
be universalizable to meet the Kantian test of justice, and O’Neill argues that in the economic
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outcomes;41 or not recognizing or enforcing key human rights such as subsistence.42 Together, these views agree that the trading system is not meeting core normative standards in the way it treats individual human beings
everywhere, particularly the most vulnerable and those suffering readily
avoidable harms.
One can also argue that the contemporary trading system is unjust
from the perspective of Rawlsian egalitarian liberalism, which I consider as
distinct from cosmopolitanism.43 On this view, the trading system is unjust
because it does not satisfy the requirements of an international difference
principle, namely that inequalities in social goods (such as the rights, privileges, and opportunities of trade law and the wealth they create) be justifiable by virtue of their benefit to the least advantaged.44 While trade
preferences and other forms of special and differential treatment (“S&D”)
designed to benefit the least favored states might contribute to such justification in principle, the current structure of S&D fails, thereby leaving the
trading system unjustified and unjust on a structural level.45 The system is
in fact promoting the interests of the most advantaged, rather than the least
advantaged, giving rise to a legitimate grievance on the part of the least
advantaged.
From an entirely different perspective, Richard Miller also objects to
certain aspects of the trading system. Miller, a nationalist, is opposed to the
cosmopolitan global justice project but nevertheless acknowledges a vast
unmet obligation on the part of developed states to developing states on the
basis of an abuse of power and position.46 In particular, with respect to the
trading system, Miller characterizes the one-sided dominance of the WTO
rule making process by wealthy developed states as an abuse of power that
has resulted in exploitative rules that would not have been agreed to in a
process of reasonable deliberation.47 From this perspective, the overreaching that characterized the Uruguay Round gives rise to a duty to address and
sphere this requires institutionalizing support for not only human agency but the capacities of
more vulnerable human beings. Id.
41. See, e.g., PETER SINGER, ONE WORLD: THE ETHICS OF GLOBALIZATION 156–58 (2002).
42. See, e.g., CHARLES JONES, GLOBAL JUSTICE: DEFENDING COSMOPOLITANISM 34–35
(1999).
43. Caney includes within cosmopolitan accounts such theories which argue that participation in an institutional scheme is essential to distributive obligations, which he terms “institutionalist” cosmopolitan theories (following Pogge). See CANEY, supra note 17, at 105–06. However,
in my view, such theories (Rawlsian accounts being a chief example) are not as truly cosmopolitan as what Caney calls “interactionalist” theories, where one’s distributive obligations exist independently of there being a requisite institutional participation, because I take the essence of
cosmopolitanism to be a non-contingent universalism. In this sense, I believe Caney conflates
transboundary normative obligations with cosmopolitanism.
44. See GARCIA, TRADE, INEQUALITY AND JUSTICE, supra note 18, at 147–92.
45. Id. at 190–92.
46. MILLER, supra note 23, at 70–71.
47. Id. at 69–83.
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remedy this injustice in subsequent rounds, such as Doha.48 Miller characterizes the current impasse in Doha as “an ongoing process of bullying,”
since maintaining the status quo means maintaining the exploitative rules
enacted in the Uruguay Round that are the basis for developing country
objections.49
3. The Internal Approach to Trade and Justice
What these external approaches have in common is that they superimpose principles of justice such as human rights or liberal distributive principles on the present structure of international economic law institutions.
However, there is another way to approach the relationship between principles of justice and international economic law, from an entirely different
direction that does away with the need for complex attempts at mediating
the gap between theory and practice. We can look for principles of justice
within the systems and institutions we are studying, rather than outside of
them.50 Alternatively, we can focus on a phenomenological investigation of
trade as a human experience and analyze the role that consent plays in making trade “trade” and not something else—exploitation, coercion, or
predation.51
In his “structural equity” approach, Aaron James examines principles
of fairness that are inherent within the global economic system by virtue of
the structure of that system. These principles comprise “structural equity,”
the manner in which an institution distributes its advantages and disadvantages in order to achieve equitable results.52 Thus, instead of discussing
justice in international trade from the point of view of external approaches
(such as nationalism or cosmopolitanism), internal approaches look at the
system as it is already structured and offer a prescriptive analysis rooted in
the framework of the trade regime. Through the concept of “structural equity,” which dictates how gains and burdens are shared within a system,53
48. Id. at 73.
49. Id. at 73. Miller cites as examples the same agriculture negotiations which Bhala highlights in his article, for the same reasons.
50. See, e.g., id. at 71 (suggesting that it is important to look within organizations for demands of justice distinctive to their internal framework); James, Internal Principles, supra note
28, at 100–02.
51. See Garcia, Is Free Trade “Free?”, supra note 9, at 506.
52. James distinguishes three principles of structural equity in trade relations. The first principle concerns the harms from trade, that is, certain individuals will be adversely impacted by free
trade and measures should be taken by states to alleviate such impact. An example of this principle is the controversial Trade Adjustment Assistance that was attached to the bills of the FTAs
between the United States and Korea, Panama and Colombia in U.S. Congress. The second principle requires that the gains of trade be equally distributed within a society or in manner acceptable
to all members of that society. The third principle is simply the second principle brought up on a
global basis so that trading societies share equally in the gains of trade or distribute those gains in
a manner acceptable to them all. James, Internal Principles, supra note 28, at 110.
53. Id. at 114–15.
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we can try to deduce standards of justice, which can be applied to international economic law as a means of evaluating policies and procedures and
offering policy recommendations.
In view of the present inquiry, I will begin with the WTO. The aim of
the WTO is clear: “to preserve the basic principles and to further the objectives underlying this multilateral trading system.”54 The WTO agreements
have established a series of rights and obligations for its members and created a series of expectations in these members. The organization seeks to
protect these expectations through various channels exemplified by the Dispute Settlement Understanding, which authorizes prevailing parties to suspend trade concessions against losing parties to a WTO dispute that fail to
comply.
There is a growing body of literature analyzing the asymmetrical effectiveness of the “suspension of concessions” system since large prevailing
parties can more effectively enforce their judgments due to the significance
of their market to the losing party, whereas smaller prevailing parties cannot because their market is too small for loss of access to be an effective
sanction.55 At one level, this is an issue of institutional design and treaty
compliance. However, a structural equity analysis also reveals this to be a
question of justice. When an authorized suspension of concessions is an
effective compliance tool in a case brought by a developed country, but the
same rule is not as effective when a developing country is awarded the right
to suspend concessions, we are faced with an unjust result.56 This is an
internal issue because this failure reflects a frustration of member expectations through an ineffective means of dispute settlement. It is a justice issue
because, as Chios Charmody points out, WTO justice is about maintaining
an equal distribution of expectations regarding trade related behavior; the
ethos is justice-as-equality.57 Thus, on this account justice and fairness are
intrinsic parts of the WTO because they are integral parts of the system
itself, and its failures are internal failures of structural equity.
54. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867
U.N.T.S. 194, pmbl.
55. See, e.g., Gregory Shaffer, Developing Country Use of the WTO Dispute Settlement System: Why it Matters, the Barriers Posed, in TRADE DISPUTES AND THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
UNDERSTANDING OF THE WTO: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY ASSESSMENT 167, 182 (James C. Hartigan
ed., 2009); Gregory Shaffer & Yvonne Apea Mensah, Institutional Choice in the General System
of Preferences Case: Who Decides the Conditions for Trade Preferences? The Law and Politics of
Rights, 39 J. WORLD TRADE 977, 989–95 (2005); see also Håkan Nordströmand & Gregory C.
Shaffer, Access to Justice in the World Trade Organization: A Case for a Small Claims Procedure?, 7 WORLD TRADE REV. 587, 590, 594–604 (2008). See generally SONIA E. ROLLAND, DEVELOPMENT AT THE WTO (2012) (reviewing in chapter seven the obstacles to successful
participation in the DSU by developing countries).
56. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border
Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005).
57. See Chios Carmody, A Theory of WTO Law, 11 J. INT’L ECON. L. 527, 542 (2008).
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Another approach looks at the nature of trade itself as a human experience. On this view, trade is fundamentally a voluntary, bilateral exchange
of economic value. Individuals and peoples enter into trade relationships
with the same fundamental motivation: to improve their condition. Thus, in
general, people will enter into trade relations that they consider fair if they
are free to make and choose their own bargains, and this shapes the nature
of the trade regime in the long run.
However, not everything called “trade” is really trade—economic exchanges have also been used to dominate and conquer.58 There are many
types of transactions that involve transfers of value, but they are not trade
because the absence of consent undermines the requisite voluntary element
of a trade relationship. In the words of Simone Weil, when one seeks consent where there is no power of refusal, the result is not trade, but oppression.59 In such cases, an economic benefit flows from one party to the other,
but it is not mutual in any meaningful way.
The same can be said in cases of coercion, where there is some consent
on the surface but the artificial restriction on the range of possible bargains
makes consent a pure formality. Furthermore, exchanges that do not involve
roughly equal value cannot be considered trade but are really exploitation;
when the prevailing party has excluded a potentially higher bidder from the
exchange, that party is exploiting the other in the resulting bargain.60
In all three cases, what is ostensibly called trade is really something
else—predation, coercion, or exploitation—and the distinguishing mark is
an absence of real or fully free consent to the bargain. Such dynamics by
their nature mean that affected individuals will accept transactions that are
disadvantageous or unfair by external standards because they are not free to
do otherwise. Consent can thus function as a standard of justice, but it is not
an external principle; instead, it is a characteristic of the phenomenon itself.
Moreover, unlike WTO members’ “equality,” it is not derived from the
structure of an institution but from an intuitive understanding of trade
generally.
Applying a consent approach to actual international trade agreements
illustrates the subtle but important forces at work in contemporary trade
relations, particularly as they involve substantial inequalities in power
among participating states. These inequalities and their structural consequences undercut economic fairness through their effects on the rules of the
58. For example, trading companies asserted sovereignty and extended the colonizing states’
dominion over vast territories the European states were not ready to administer directly. See
ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY, AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 68
(2005).
59. Simone Weil, Are We Struggling for Justice?, in SIMONE WEIL 116, 121–23 (Eric O.
Springsted ed., 1998).
60. Hillel Steiner, A Liberal Theory of Exploitation, 94 ETHICS 225, 231–33 (1984); see also
MILLER, supra note 23, at 60–69 (describing exploitation as a form of ‘taking advantage’ of the
weak bargaining position of those in dire need).
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game, making it less likely that trade law and institutions will either meet
members’ legitimate expectations of equality or establish rules supporting
true consensual exchanges among market actors. Without consent, agreements structuring economic exchange will be a form of oppression, or
worse, predation, which cause systemic disadvantages to certain players.61
Returning to the WTO, we can see that many of the complaints persistently raised by developing countries share a common theme: The trading
rules are made without their effective consent62 and establish trade relations
between developed and developing countries along coercive or exploitative
lines.63 Bhala’s analysis of Doha’s current position on agriculture alone
gives us many illustrations of the one-sided bargains that continue to disadvantage Muslim and other developing countries and plague WTO negotiations.64 Sadly, many regional trade agreements such as the recent Central
America Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA), a 2004 regional trade agreement between the U.S., five Central American states, and the Dominican
Republic, also furnish examples of what is ostensibly free trade but is in
fact a form of coercion (no free bargaining), exploitation (no equivalent
value), or predation (no consent).65
4. Summary
Both external and internal approaches to the problem of trade and justice paint a damning portrait of the unfairness of the contemporary trading
system. When cosmopolitans, egalitarians, and nationalists agree, then there
is good reason to treat this as an emerging global consensus. This is, incidentally, an illustration of Sen’s plural grounding approach in action: We
need a multitude of cogent arguments evaluating injustice and compelling
us to action.66 It remains for those in power to shift the system in a more
just direction, or those with less power will make their frustrations known
in whatever ways they can. This is central to the problem that Bhala tackles,
because it is precisely this perception of unfairness that raises the security
concerns Bhala writes about.

61. See Garcia, Is Free Trade “Free?”, supra note 9, at 514–15.
62. Sonia E. Rolland, Redesigning the Negotiation Process at the WTO, 13 J. INT’L ECON. L.
65 (2010) (citing disenfranchisement of developing countries in WTO decision making and suggesting strategies for overcoming this).
63. MILLER, supra note 23, at 77–79 (citing agricultural subsidies and mandated liberalization as examples).
64. Bhala, supra note 1, at 11–12.
65. See generally Garcia, Is Free Trade “Free?”, supra note 9, at 514–22. On RTAs generally see Chin Lim, The Trade Agreements Regime: WTO and the RTAs, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK
ON GLOBAL JUSTICE AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW, supra note 10.
66. See SEN, supra note 25, at 12–15, 301–04.
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B. Trade, Security and the Social Psychology of Justice
Social psychologists are interested in justice in a particular way,
namely in the social formation of perceptions of justice and injustice and
their effect as motivators—the human emotional responses they provoke.67
Understanding the psychology of justice is important for this conversation
and for the trading system in general, because trade’s contribution to peace
and security depends upon people’s beliefs about the justice or injustice of
the trading system.68
One way to explore the psychology of justice is through equity theory,
which views all interpersonal interactions, including trade transactions, as
exchange transactions involving various resources.69 People make certain
investments or inputs, in return for which they expect to receive certain
rewards, or outputs. Justice involves their evaluation of the relationship between inputs and outputs.
This relationship can be analyzed along two dimensions: reciprocity
between inputs and outputs and proportionality between inputs and outputs.
Reciprocity consists of receiving when one has contributed, and proportionality consists of the relationship between the level of one’s contribution and
the level of one’s received outputs.70 One’s perception of justice or injustice
depends upon one’s evaluation of the proportionality and reciprocity between one’s inputs into the social system and the outputs one receives. Inputs create expectations that vary in proportion to the inputting person’s
evaluation of the level of input. These expectations also involve a social
comparison process, in which people evaluate their own returns by comparison with the returns and investments of others and judge their situation not
only by their absolute outcome but by whether their comparisons with
others meet or disappoint their expectations.71
In this framework, when people judge their social rewards to be proportional to their costs and investments, both absolutely and relatively, they
deem their situation as just or equitable.72 This supports the establishment
67. This section draws upon and updates earlier work on trade, security, and justice. See
Garcia, supra note 14.
68. See, e.g., AMERICO BEVIGLIA ZAMPETTI, FAIRNESS IN THE WORLD ECONOMY: US PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE RELATIONS 26–40 (2006) (reviewing the role fairness plays
in legitimizing and even constituting markets and international institutions).
69. See, e.g., C. Wesley Younts & Charles W. Mueller, Justice Processes: Specifying the
Mediating Role of Perceptions of Distributive Justice, 66 AM. SOC. REV. 125, 126 (2001) (suggesting equity theory continues to play dominating role in the field). See generally Tornblöom,
supra note 12, at 179–82.
70. Scherer, supra note 13, at 6–7.
71. Tornblöom, supra note 12, at 181 (citing Peter M. Blau, Justice in Social Exchange, 34
SOC. INQUIRY 193, 194–95 (1964)). See generally PETER M. BLAU, EXCHANGE AND POWER IN
SOCIAL LIFE 143–67 (2d prtg. 1964) (reviewing role of expectations in comparative evaluations
of fairness of outcomes).
72. Tornblöom, supra note 12, at 181. This is a foundational tenet of exchange theory. See
also GEORGE CASPER HOMANS, SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: ITS ELEMENTARY FORMS 30–111 (1961).
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and maintenance of orderly social relations, or security as we are calling it
today. Injustice involves the defeat of these expectations. Perceived discrepancies between the actual and the expected match between inputs and outcomes result in the subjective experience of inequity.73 Outputs can be
deficient either in terms of their proportionality, their reciprocity, or both.
When the rewards are perceived to be insufficient in either sense, a condition of inequity prevails, giving rise to psychological distress and a desire to
terminate the relationship, or at least alter it in the direction of equity.
This is the core reaction mechanism that can lead to social conflict
over perceptions of injustice. In the words of one theorist: “Strong expectations coupled with the feeling of having invested in making the expectations
come true obviously produce feelings of entitlement. Violations of such entitlements can then be defined as perceived injustice, and will reliably provoke strong negative emotional reactions.”74 These reactions manifest
themselves socially in disaffection, underproduction, anger, conflict, boycott, and sabotage. In other words, perceptions of injustice contribute to
individual and group behavior that threatens peace and security.
This is where the trading system and, in particular, the DDR come in.
If we want to understand trade’s contribution to peace and security, and the
stakes for all of us if Bhala is right that we have abandoned Doha’s emphasis on security through justice, we first need to understand people’s perceptions about the justice of the trading system and the global economy it
structures in terms of its effects on people’s inputs and outputs. In particular, Bhala has reminded us that we need to understand the perceptions of the
Muslim world with respect to the justice of the trading system.
The theoretical starting point in terms of people’s expectations of
trade, including Muslim expectations, is that trade is supposed to be a winwin proposition. According to conventional liberal trade theory, we can reasonably expect that freer trade will lead to overall welfare increases. Of
course, there will nevertheless be short-term and individual uncompensated
losses. These individual losses create social welfare problems for states but
should in theory be manageable through first-best policies that do not distort trade as they address the particular problem in question.75
However, when we look at the global economy and levels of global
development today, we see evidence suggesting that in practice trade may
not be a win-win proposition, even over the long term, for certain states and
social groups within states.76 Looking horizontally between states, we see
73. Tornblöom, supra note 12, at 181.
74. Scherer, supra note 13, at 7.
75. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 3–4, 14–15 (3d ed. 2005) (discussing classic trade theory and effects on social
welfare legislation).
76. U.N. Dev. Programme, Human Development Report 2011, at 2 (2011), http://hdr.undp.
org/en/reports/global/hdr2011/ [hereinafter 2011 UNDP].
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states that seem to persist in the loser position over time.77 There are winners—Chile, India, Poland, and Turkey (the one Muslim exception), for
example, with export growth averaging more than 5% per year78—but there
are losers, too, such as Niger, Bangladesh, and Sierra Leone.79 As Bhala
points out, there is a disturbing preponderance of Muslim countries in the
latter group, with Pakistan and Yemen being notable examples with respect
to contemporary security issues.80 Looking vertically within states, there is
also evidence of persistent and growing inequality between individuals and
between groups, and evidence that free trade may be intensifying these conditions for the least advantaged individuals and groups.81 As Bhala points
out, this also applies to Muslim populations within non-Muslim states.82
The many states, individuals, and social groups—too many, in my
view—that find themselves in the persistent losing position become sources
of the potentially destabilizing perceptions of trade injustice that are the
subject of Bhala’s argument. Media accounts of trade and globalization reveal ample evidence of ambivalence and conflict over the perceived fairness
of globalization and international economic policy and their effects on
poorer people and states.83
Looking horizontally between states, there is evidence of a growing
disillusionment among non-OECD countries (including in particular Muslim states or states with large Muslim populations) with respect to the perceived failure of globalization’s promised benefits for their people.84
77. See, e.g., New Forum May Be Necessary to Tackle Globalization: Supachai, JAPAN
ECON. NEWSWIRE, Feb. 12, 2000, available at LexisNexis (developing countries concerned that
globalization is widening economic gap between industrialized and developing countries).
78. 2011 UNDP, supra note 76, at 126.
79. Id.
80. See generally Alan B. Krueger & David D. Laitin, Kto Kogo?: A Cross-Country Study of
the Origins and Targets of Terrorism, in TERRORISM ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND POLITICAL
OPENNESS 148–73 (Philip Keefer ed., 2008); see also JEREMY M. SHARP, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RL34170, YEMEN: BACKGROUND AND US RELATIONS 1–17 (2010); Bruce Reidel, Pakistan and
Terror: The Eye of the Storm, 618 ANNALS AM. SOC’Y POL. & SOC. SCI. 31, 31–32 (2008).
81. See, e.g., Hardev Kaur, Unfair Trade Practices of Developed Nations, NEW STRAIT
TIMES MALAYSIA, Oct. 17, 2000, at 12 (illustrating globalization is characterized by growing gap
between rich and poor within countries); see also Injustice and Poverty Root Causes of Terrorism:
Moin, THE NEWS INT’L, Oct. 30, 2011, http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=
75218&Cat=4.
82. Bhala, supra note 1, at 17.
83. See, e.g., Annan Calls for Fair Globalisation, World Leaders Divided, THE PRESS TRUST
OF INDIA, Sept. 21, 2004, available at LexisNexis (UN Secretary General notes that too many
people feel excluded by globalization); see also Radio Interview by Michael Martin with Raj
Shah, Admin. U.S. Agency Int’l Dev. (June 22, 2011), available at http://www.npr.org/2011/06/
22/137342466/usaid-administrator-on-food-costs-shortages.
84. This is particularly noteworthy in Muslim states such as Pakistan, Malaysia and Saudi
Arabia. See, e.g., Economist: Selective Liberalization is Better, THE MALAYSIAN STAR, Feb. 28,
2000 (changing perception among developing countries towards globalization attributable to lack
of tangible benefits, economic costs and social dislocations); Malaysia Urges Developing Nations
to Voice Globalization Fears, ASIA PULSE, Jan. 26, 2000, available at Factivia, Doc. No.
apulse0020010804dw1q016ht (stating globalization is widening, not decreasing, the knowledge

\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\9-1\UST104.txt

210

unknown

Seq: 17

UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL

3-OCT-12

8:47

[Vol. 9:1

Globalization is criticized for being in the control of wealthy states that
structure it for their own benefit.85 Moreover, there is a widespread perception, both within the Muslim community and generally, that globalization is
making inequality worse between states.86
Looking vertically within states, one again finds the perception that
globalization is widening the gap, this time between rich and poor groups
within states.87 There is particular concern that globalization is not addressing the poorest and neediest within states.88 Overall, one finds that many of
the criticisms of globalization explicitly use normative language to describe
globalization as unjust.89 Indeed, the entire system of trade and globalization has been called “exploitative” of the developing world.90
gap between societies); Saudi Minister Warns Impacts of Economic Globalization, XINHUA GENNEWS SERVICE, Jan. 22, 2000, available at LexisNexis (suggesting that globalization is
damaging both new industries and traditional exports in many developing countries); see also
Militancy & Poverty Make a Never-Ending Vicious Cycle, THE NEWS INT’L, Mar. 17, 2011, http:/
/www.thenews.com.pk/PrintEdition.aspx?ID=36455&Cat=6&dt=5/4/2011; Kill Poverty to Fight
Terrorism: Rahul Ghandi, UNITED NEWS OF INDIA, Mar. 15, 2011, available at LexisNexis; PM:
Terrorism Can’t Be Defeated Without Eradication of Poverty, RIGHT VISION NEWS, Oct. 18, 2010,
available at LexisNexis.
85. See, e.g., Nigeria: Multilateralism at Crossroads, AFR. NEWS, Apr. 26, 2005, available at
LexisNexis (suggesting that globalization being driven by multinational corporations “masquerading under the flags of western nations”); Globalization can be Reshaped, ASIA AFR. INTELLIGENCE
WIRE, Feb. 28, 2005 (fairer globalization requires reform of globalization institutions created for
the good of OECD countries); Developing Nations Urged to Resist Globalization, XINHUA NEWS
AGENCY, June 10, 2002, available at Proquest, Doc. No. 453478561 (arguing that globalization
favors developed countries which are already beneficiaries of current system); see also Raja Aqeel
& Abdul Rasheed Azad, Food, Human Insecurity Breed Extremism and Terrorism: Moot, BUS.
RECORDER, Mar. 14, 2011, http://www.brecorder.com/component/news/single/627:news.html?id=
1165990.
86. See, e.g., India: Globalization Promotes Monopolies, GLOBAL NEWS WIRE, Nov. 21,
2001 (global markets have failed to converge and inequality of income between countries has
increased); Myanmar Warns of Challenges Brought by Globalization, KYODO NEWS INTERNATIONAL, Nov. 2, 2000, available at Proquest, Doc. No. kyodo00020010807dwb201dzb (quoting
that globalization is creating a ‘development divide’ and widening the gap between rich and poor
nations); Abdul Razak Ahmad, The Darker Side of Globalization, NEW STRAITS TIMES MALAYSIA, Nov. 16, 1998, at 5 (suggesting that globalization is causing a gap between rich and poor to
increase with little redress for the poor); see also NHRC Chairperson Justice Anand Calls for
Making Human Development a Basic Human Right, HINDUSTAN TIMES, June 28, 2006, available
at Factivia, Doc. No. HNTM000020060705e26s00161.
87. See, e.g., Ghana: The Globalisation Debate: An Opportunity or Threat to Developing
Economies, AFR. NEWS, Mar. 23, 2005, available at LexisNexis (arguing that globalization is
increasing the resource drain from the poor majority to the wealthy elite within developing and
even developed countries); India: Globalization Promotes Monopolies, GLOBAL NEWS WIRE,
Nov. 21, 2001 (global markets have failed to converge and inequality of income within countries
has increased).
88. See, e.g., Sinha Urges More Aid to Poor Nations, THE HINDU BUS. LINE, Oct. 29, 2000,
http://www.hindu.com/businessline/2000/10/29/stories/142920.jz.html (citing economic and social distortions of globalization, Indian Finance Minister urges focus on equity and concern for the
poor).
89. See, e.g., Saudi Minister Warns Impacts of Economic Globalization, supra note 84
(stressing that globalization highlights the need for a “fair” world economic system).
90. Sinha Urges More Aid to Poor Nations, supra note 88 (suggesting that anti-globalization
protests reflect perception that globalization exploits the poor of developing countries); Kayode
ERAL
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Such perceptions do not bode well for trade’s capacity to promote security—quite the opposite.91 Recall that equity theory suggests that perceptions of injustice will be accompanied by patterns of civil disaffection,
underproduction, anger, conflict, boycott, and sabotage.92 Such behavior in
an international context is certainly multi-causal, but we must nevertheless
consider the relationship between widespread negative perceptions of trade
and globalization and the existence of the types of conflict and instability,
which the social psychology literature cautions us to expect. At its most
extreme, there is a troubling correlation—which equity theory predicts—
between the targets and rhetoric of terrorism and the patterns of global economic inequality and attendant perceptions of injustice.93 I agree with
Bhala’s point about the empirics of poverty and terror: It is a mistake to
focus too narrowly on establishing a link between poverty and extreme acts
(“Are the violent actors poor?”)—instead, we need to look at poverty and
the political climate it creates in support of Western-targeted violence.
While I take Delahunty’s point that there is no simple linear connection
between injustice and terrorism,94 one can point to a link between inequality and the targets of terrorist activity, consistent with third-world public
opinion and perceptions of economic injustice.95 Moreover, the culture of
resentment and grievance is at least as dangerous to economic prosperity
and security as specific violent acts by individuals, poor or not. The rhetoric
Komolafe, World Summit, Just Another Review of Poverty?, THIS DAY, Sept. 13, 2005, available
at General Reference Center Gold, Doc. No. GALE|A136283840.
91. See, e.g., Annan Calls for Fair Globalisation, World Leaders Divided, supra note 83
(suggesting too many people feel threatened by globalization); Globalization and Poverty, J.
BANKING & FIN. SERVICES, Dec. 1, 2001, at 18, 18–20 (dealing with problem of peace requires
dealing with problem of poverty and inequity).
92. See supra note 74 and accompanying text; see also U.N. Dev. Programme, Human Development Report 1999, at 11 (1999) (migration pressure, environmental pressure, social conflict
and instability of many forms attributable to perceived widening income gap between countries).
93. See, e.g., Alan Friedman, Forum Focuses on ‘Wrath’ Born of Poverty; Rich and Powerful Debate How to Bridge Wealth Gap, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Feb 5, 2005, at 11 (arguing terrorism
and anti-globalization violence can be manifestations of frustration over inequitable
globalization).
94. See Delahunty, supra note 8, at 161; see also Alberto Abadie, Poverty, Political Freedom
and the Roots of Terrorism, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 50, 50 (2006) (indicating no clear link between
poverty levels and levels of terrorism); Alan B. Krueger & Jitka Maleckova, Education, Poverty,
Political Violence and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?, Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9074 (2002), available at http://www.nber.org/papers.w9074 (arguing
there is no link between levels of poverty or education and participation in politically motivated
violence).
95. See, e.g., Krueger & Laitin, supra note 80, at 4 (stating research suggests terrorism
targets states perceived to “bask in economic success”); Annan Calls for Fair Globalisation,
World Leaders Divided, supra note 83 (quoting Brazilian president reminding that the “most destructive weapon of mass destruction in the world is poverty”); Nigeria: Between Globalisation
and Glocalisation, AFR. NEWS, Mar. 14, 2005, available at LexisNexis (quoting that local effects
of globalization mean that US hope that globalization would promote peace “could [not be] further from the truth”); Zambia; Gap Between Rich and Poor Nations Worries Prof. Chinene, AFR.
NEWS, Aug. 8, 2002, available at LexisNexis (growing imbalance between rich and poor nations a
major threat to global peace and security).
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and dark vision of the aggressively resentful remain and persist in their
negative effects long after rubble is cleared and bodies buried.
This brings us back to Doha. If we combine the persistent and pervasive assertions of national interest on the part of wealthy WTO member
states in the Round, the persistent and pervasive negative perceptions of the
unfairness of the WTO and the trading system today, and the tangible loss
of momentum on growth and development due to the global financial crisis,
we have an explosive combination of blindness, selfishness, despair, and
loss of opportunity that cannot help but have serious negative repercussions
for all of us everywhere. The failure of Doha is a loss of historic magnitude.
Bhala correctly points out that the WTO’s political arguments in favor
of Doha have now shifted in response to changes in the prevailing winds,
with job creation and global recovery being the latest mantra in the wake of
the current global financial crisis.96 In one sense, that is not surprising—a
good advocate will link her arguments to the priorities of the forum. However, this may also suggest a larger problem: that the original link between
Doha, development, and security was itself an earlier, similar move—a superficial gloss to the Round seeking to capitalize on the politics of the moment—in that case, the post-9/11 moment.
If so, this does not so much weaken Bhala’s argument as suggest an
even deeper reason for concern: that as early as 2001, the WTO was seeking
rhetorical justifications for a Round that was fundamentally created not to
sincerely address the concerns of the bottom billion but to resolve a political impasse in the WTO in favor of wealthier states. This impasse was born
out of acute economic frustration on the part of developing countries, manifesting itself not as terrorism but as a commitment in Seattle to obstruct any
progress on developed countries’ priorities until these concerns were addressed. Unfortunately, these priorities reasserted themselves almost as
soon as the Round was under way, once the rhetorical nod towards development had been sufficient to broker the start of another Round. Doha was
never really going to be about justice, or development, or for that matter
security.
III. CONCLUSION
Many of us who wrote about trade or international relations immediately following 9/11, myself included, commented on the relationship between trade and security—in a sense, we were all national security scholars
for a moment. Bhala has not let us forget that fact and reminds us that every
trade agreement, and every piece of trade scholarship, is necessarily about
poverty and justice. The key question is whether it will be explicitly so and
whether it will aim to move the system in the right direction—towards reduced poverty and increased justice—or not.
96. Bhala, supra note 4, at 141–42.
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I have been fortunate to teach and lecture about trade and globalization
to students from many parts of the world, and most recently I found myself
in Australia in a globalization seminar of twenty-four students, eight of
whom were Muslim men from Saudi Arabia. It was a remarkable opportunity for an offshore conversation on sensitive subjects with a group I was
otherwise unlikely to be able to speak with in this way. Amidst all of the
complex cultural and political issues one can imagine would be a part of our
dialogue, every single Saudi student had the same concern and the same
goal for themselves and their country, and it was not an ideological one:
They all wanted a job, and the prospects of having one were not good.
Given the nature of the global trading system as it now stands, I had no
good answer for them.
If the WTO and its dominant states heed Bhala’s call to return to the
founding rhetoric of the Doha Development Round—that poverty, development, and justice matter to all of us, if for no other reason than our basic
security—then perhaps if I see those students again, I will have something
hopeful to tell them.
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